This article examines changing governing practices in the context of the Sino-Vietnamese border in the Guangxi Autonomous Region of China. The groups inhabiting the mountainous ranges of this ethnically diverse part of Southeast Asia evaded the reach of the state until the 1970s, when China and Vietnam started tightening control over the land border after the border war. With an increasingly rigid and clearly delimited Sino-Vietnamese borderland, binary forms of classification began to replace earlier fluid identifications, and the room for diverse social and cultural expressions became restricted. It is within this context that the ethnic marriage practices straddling the borders of China and its southern neighboring states discussed in this article took place. Cross-border ethnic Yao marriages have changed from customary to illegal in recent years as a result of China's strict population control, its changing demography, and the accelerated shortage of manual labor in its border area. Border politics have permeated the private sphere, transforming common ethnic marriage partners into illegal migrants. Although ethnic marriage partners are relegated to an illegal status, they are indispensible in the local labor market and moral economy as mothers, caretakers, translators, guides, and manual workers. This article argues that, despite being antithetical to the bordering logic of state sovereignty, they are important agents who depend on and capitalize on the border economy.
Introduction
Starting in the 1990s, increased human mobility and travel started blurring or even erasing the traditionally perceived rigidity of state borders (Albert and Brock 1996; Appadurai 1996) .
Additionally, since the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a "proliferation of the borders" (Shapira 2013, 249) . New walls and fences have been constructed as purported defense mechanisms against "terrorists" and "illegal migrants" (Doty 2014, 200) 
The Yao Who Cross the Mountains
In May 2014, a knife attack by a group of Chinese (allegedly Uyghur) border crossers at the control post in Dongxing on the Sino-Vietnamese border led to an increase in border checks. As a result, the locals in neighboring Ningming County were worried that they would not be able to take part in the annual festival in Lộc Bình town (C: Luping) on the Vietnamese side of the border. The festival attracts people from both sides of the border who come to socialize with relatives over a meal, visit the local market, and enjoy local entertainment (figure 2). My research assistant and I had made arrangements to meet with several Yao villagers from the Chinese side of the border at the market in Lộc Bình, but three hours before the designated meeting time, while we were in a taxi on the way from our hotel in Pingxiang, the Chinese villagers called us to say that they did not think they would be able to come to the market after all, because the border police were not letting them through, even with their border residents' passes. We asked if they could take a mountain path that they sometimes use to cross to Vietnam, but they were not sure whether they would be able to do so on this occasion. The Yao guide who had accompanied us from China to Vietnam commented at this point: "There are several mountain paths that even they [the border patrol] do not know". To our surprise, by the time we had crossed the Friendship Gate and traveled nearly 40 kilometers from the border checkpoint to Lộc Bình, the group of villagers we were hoping to meet were already waiting for us at the market. While we had endured an arduous, bumpy three-hour ride on the muddy roads of rural Vietnam, the villagers had made it to the festival on foot in less than one hour. As one of the villagers pointed out later that day, the Gong Shan mountain they live on in China and the mountain in Vietnam is the same, and it is impractical and time consuming for them to go to the other side of the border through the checkpoints. That day they were planning to cross the border through the checkpoint in Aidian because of the visible increase in border guards in the area. This encounter shows how the imposition of the state border has affected daily interactions between Yao living on either side, and how the Yao address the limitations of the border mechanism. The way they navigate this transnational border space is rooted in their myth of origins, traditional lifestyle, and new opportunities arising from the border economy. 
According to Yao beliefs, their ancestors came from Hunan and Guangdong
Provinces in China and migrated outward to the southwestern borders of the empire and beyond in search of arable land in the mountains to cultivate their crops (millet, corn, sweet potatoes, yams, and so forth). Yao history was recorded by the Yao people themselves and retold in written narratives, "The Charter of Emperor Ping" (评皇券牒ping huang juan die) or the "Passport for Crossing the Mountains" (過山榜guo shan bang) (Alberts 2007, 129-145; 2011) . Written in Chinese characters and traditionally recited in the Yao language, different variations tell how the Yao were forced to move away from central China due to natural disasters and the pressures of taxes and corvée labor imposed by local rulers, and how they survived the dangerous journey and reached the southern provinces. Presented as scrolls or, in more recent variants, as hand-copied texts, these documents are said to have derived from the Chinese imperial writs granting them exclusive rights to cross and cultivate the mountains. The migration routes of the Yao and the text of the "passport" are copied and passed on to the descending generations across Southeast Asia (figures 3a and 3b). Although their imperial origins cannot be ascertained, the charters have been recognized as important Chinese imperial rulers had a long-standing tradition of using the tools of cartography and ethnography in an attempt to categorize the empire's diverse population into governable subjects (Hostetler 2002) . This practice continued well into the twentieth century; Ralph Litzinger's research shows how Yao history became part of the Chinese official national narrative after the Communist Revolution (Litzinger 2000) . Ever since the completion of the Communist ethnic identification project in the mid-1950s, the Yao and other ethnic groups with links across the border of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have been referred to in China as cross-border ethnic groups (跨境民族 kuajing minzu or 跨国民族 kuaguo minzu), although their traditions, lifestyles, and world view predate and defy the sovereign bordering logic of the modern state system (Zhou 2002 (Zhou , 2006 . 4 The imposition of a cross-border ethnic identity reflects the limits of the sovereign state's system of governance and its categories of distinction, which enforce a clear separation between nationals and non-nationals, although these divisions in fact do not exist. (Fei 1991, 19) . However, the effects and implications of the sovereignty-driven discourses, policies, and practices on the social and cultural practices that precede and survive the state border are rarely considered. The category of cross-border ethnic identity imposes state-centric lines of distinction where they exist only tenuously, marking as illegal practices that do not conform to the state's bordering logic (Galemba 2013, 275) . One such practice is ethnic marriage.
Yao Marriage and Borders
As social and cultural anthropologists have long observed, marriage in China has
traditionally been "about borders and boundaries" (Oxfeld 2005, 19) . Moreover, the normative principles of patrilineality and patrilocality practiced by Yao mean that, According to villagers and local officials, cross-border marriage movement continued uncontrolled until the early 2000s or so. Until then, marriage partners from Vietnam could join the local household register at the discretion of local authorities after a nominal fine was paid. Speaking about the cross-border marriages of the past, the villagers shared that it used to be easy for Vietnamese marriage partners to get a local hukou (household registration): "In those days it was enough to have a word with the village head, and you could get a hukou" (interview, April 14, 2013) . A representative of the local police office would assist unregistered residents in adding their names to the hukou. However, it is now impossible for marriage partners to obtain household registration even with a fine. Deportations rarely take place, but channels for Yao women from Vietnam to legally marry Chinese men are nonexistent in the area. The older generation of women are able to keep their hukou, but those who came from Vietnam starting in the 1990s were removed from the hukou register. In general, women of the older generation who came from Vietnam are considered "Chinese" (i.e., with hukou), while younger women are considered "illegal" (feifa) (interview with a villager, April 14, 2013).
Around 2007, new population control measures were introduced in the area, limiting the number of children in Yao families to two, with all subsequent "illegal births" and all unsanctioned births subjected to hefty fines (7,000 RMB in 2010; 10,000 RMB in 2013). One To start with, they [the authorities] said it would be possible to transfer my wife's hukou to here. First, they said it would be possible, but then it became impossible. I wanted to get hukou for her from the beginning, [because] only with hukou can she be legal. But if my wife didn't transfer her hukou within one year of leaving Vietnam, she is not Vietnamese anymore.
6 China doesn't let her join hukou; they say that her Vietnamese hukou needs to be transferred. Like that we became illegal. (Interview, April 13, 2013) While the reasons for the increase in cross-border marriages are many (in particular, gender imbalances and the economic disparity between China and Vietnam), what these partnerships share is their undocumented and gendered character: over 90 percent of these marriages have no documentary evidence, and in the majority of cases, women cross the border and settle in China.
7 These marriages do not follow legal procedures or other bureaucratic formalities and are arranged according to local customs outside of the disciplinary logic of the two neighboring states and their migration and marriage regulations.
Traditionally, Yao marriages were arranged between families, and the record of dowry (the amount of money, meat, rice, alcohol, land, etc.) was made for or by the parents of the newlyweds (figure 4). Prior to the 1990s, the horoscopes of the couple played an important role in arranging marriages, and, according to the locals, if the horoscope reading was not considered to be favorable, the couple was deemed unsuitable and couldn't get married. The legal regulation of marriage in China works to ensure the state's control over the private lives of its citizens and makes the institution of marriage part of the project of national development (Davis 2014, 552) . A marriage that has been registered civilly and bears documentary evidence is the only state-sanctioned form of recognized family union in China. 8 Reinforced by the one-child policy since 1978, marriage regulations work to exert state control over the intimate life of Chinese citizens in order to achieve the national core objectives of economic development and modernization (Greenhalgh 2008) . Along with establishing norms for legal marriage, migration regulations and population governing policies work as a sovereign act of the state, enforcing greater control over its national borders (Friedman 2014, 301) . Mei-Hua Chen's article in this special issue and Sara
Friedman's research show how the public discourse on "fake marriage" in Taiwan sutures together "marital and migration intentions" and blurs the distinction between private and public spheres, because the legal status of marriage migrants there almost entirely hinges on their status as dependents, which they lose should the family break up (Friedman 2014, 293 ).
In the case of Yao marriage partners from Vietnam, their "illegality" due to the absence of to market days and festivals" (Schein 2005, 62 ), yet they are constructed as "migrant" by the state subject-making discourses and governance of migration and state border. This shift points to how the discourses on illegality and legality are shaped by the politics of visibility and invisibility (van Schendel and Abraham 2005) and the sovereign prerogative of the state to issue identity documents (Torpey 2000) . Since the increase in attention to this phenomenon, Chinese academic and state discourses have focused on the negative effect of growing numbers of undocumented "brides" on three areas of concern:
China's "social stability" (社会治安 shehui zhi'an), "population security" (人口安全 renkou anquan), and "national identity" (国家认同 guojia rentong) (Luo 2012, 114) . As a result, ethnic marriage partners have become constructed as "illegal migrants" by means of domestic and foreign forms of documentation and state anxiety over the increasing volume of unaccounted human mobility across its borders. The state's exercise of its authority to issue documents as a vital element of sovereignty is explicitly complicit in rendering ethnic marriage partners on the Sino-Vietnamese border illegal.
The Border Governing Predicament at the Local Level
For local authorities, the presence of undocumented residents is a sensitive (不好说的 bu hao shuo de) topic, as they expose the deficiencies and ruptures in the state governing regime over its territory and population. According to information provided by the countylevel civil affairs bureau, the estimated number of undocumented marriage partners in the county in 2012 was around one thousand (interview, April 11, 2013). 9 At the local level, there is no easy way to address the situation. During one interview, a county office representative complained about the regional civil affairs office, which promises "to make things easier for people, but it seems to work otherwise" (interview, April 9, 2013). The local officers encountered many frustrations seeking a workable approach to the situation with the undocumented ethnic marriage partners. According to the same county representative, in 2011 an investigation and research meeting attended by representatives of the public security and foreign affairs offices took place in the neighboring county. The problem was discussed, but no solution was found. The situation was reported to the central authorities, but no reply followed after two years of waiting. At the local level, no bureau has figured out how to solve the issue: "All the departments say they want to help the people, but cannot, because they have to follow their regulations" (interview, county's government office, April 9, 2013).
Another official from the family planning department boiled the problem down to the matter A simple ban would not work. In the past there was a period of time when we had strict measures, and the police repatriated women. But by the time we came back to our offices, those women had already come back by the small paths. One year we loaded all the Vietnamese women without marriage certificates onto several lorries and took them to the border, but they all came back to their homes in China…. Such big operations…are useless. They create tensions [ 冲 突 chongtu] in our work.
(Interview, county government office, April 11, 2013) There is a consensus among local officials that undocumented marriages are so prevalent because the procedures for registering marriages are very complex and expensive for local people, involving long-distance travel, the presentation of numerous types of documentary evidence, and the payment of high fees. As one official pointed out: "In reality, the people want to register; they all want that red paper, the security of the marriage. If they don't have that piece of paper, then it is just a cohabitation [同居 tongju] , but what is the value of cohabitation? It doesn't have any legal protection" (interview, county civil affairs office, April 11, 2013). In the recent move to simplify the registration process for cross-border marriages, the marriage registration office was moved from the local city to the county.
However, arranging a marriage certificate for a couple involving a spouse from Vietnam is more difficult than for a Chinese-Chinese couple. In addition to making a three-hour journey to the county center and paying a fee, the couple must obtain and authenticate documents from Vietnam (Huang and Chen 2011, 84-85) . Since the registration procedure was moved to the county, the civil affairs office has not registered a single marriage between a Chinese and a Vietnamese, partly because, as of 2013, there is no authorized office that can translate and certify Vietnamese documents at the county level.
The problem is local, involving local residents and their families, but in the context of tense Sino-Vietnamese state relations, the local government does not feel that it has any prerogative to resolve the issue on the ground and is waiting for instructions from above: "If we could do it according to the internal hukou registration and ID, then it would be easy" campaigns, and establishing shelters for the victims of trafficking (interview with a professor from Guangxi University for Nationalities, June 24, 2012). These policy priorities were dictated and determined by the global anti-human trafficking agenda of international organizations, rather than being shaped by local realities.
Local Negotiations of Illegality
In daily life, local negotiations between officials and residents, rather than the remote central state's directives and documentary evidence, influence how people interpret legal and illegal actions. The distant threat of state intervention contributes to maintaining the image of state power; however, in the local border context there is more of a gray area (Galemba 2013, 280) . This perception was articulated by one of the villagers we spoke to:
If you don't violate any laws, then you can lead a normal life; the government doesn't bother you. The government doesn't stop you from coming to live here; you just can't enjoy any favorable policies. Now they only deport the illegal workers but do not control those who live here. When we were married, the local official came to drink at our party with us! (Interview, April 14, 2013) While from the point of view of the central government, the undocumented marriage The majority of Vietnamese people cross the border via mountain paths without any documents. If the border patrol finds out, they detain them. Because they are "three illegals,"
10 it causes problems for them and us. Normally, if a Vietnamese without papers is caught, they can be detained for up to five days, and you have to give them food, drink, provide place to sleep, and then send them back to the border-crossing in a special car to repatriate them to Vietnam. There are possibilities for mutual collaboration, but there is currently no dedicated government system to put these opportunities into effect. (Interview, April 10, 2013) The undocumented Yao partners participate in the local cross-border "popular" economy outside of the bilateral state agreements. One of the mainstay industries in the county is sugar refining; however, there is not enough suitable land and labor on the Chinese side to plant sugarcane, so the informal (民间minjian) arrangement is to plant sugarcane on the Vietnamese side of the border, where there is no plant to refine sugar, and then to deliver it to the border, where it is taken to the sugar refinery on the Chinese side (interview, county government office, April 10, 2013). While local officials see a lot of potential for cooperation, the "high politics" complicate the matter. So far, the initiative lies in the hands of local entrepreneurial minds with the assistance of ethnic marriage partners. In addition to their contributions as a labor force, Vietnamese Yao women are regularly invited to dress in traditional clothes and perform mountain songs in county concerts for 100 yuan per day.
They thus fulfill the desire of the Chinese state to celebrate itself as a multiethnic, diverse society. Their minority attributes, ethnic dress, folklore, and songs are legitimate as long as their status in the country is unrecognized and their bodies are uncounted. While their labor and social roles are appropriated to help attain the state's economic and social goals, their reproductive and civil qualities are taken away from them as "nonexistent" members of Chinese society (Grillot, this issue).
Conclusion
This article examined how the new sovereign state formulations of the border, as manifested in foreign marriage registration provisions, redefine earlier existing ethnic practices and governing principles as illegal. The state's reliance on the border as a natural line delimiting the rights of citizens obstructs the provision of rights to those considered illegal and undocumented (Bosniak 1998) In order to obtain a valid marriage certificate, a marriage partner from a neighboring state's border area needs to present a valid passport or entry document, identity card, premarital health check certificate, and nonmarried status certificate from his or her country of origin. These documents have to be translated and certified by the official representative office of their country of origin before being submitted to the Civil Affairs Bureau (Registration Procedures for Marriages 2012). 8
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The same applies in Vietnam. A special Vietnamese government decree was adopted in March 2002 recognizing "fine" ethnic minority marriage customs "which demonstrate the identity of each ethnic group" and do not contradict the Law on Marriage and Family, which distinguishes between "progressive" and "backward" ethic marriage practices. Among the "backward" customs is "registration not carried out by the commune-level People's committee" (See Appendix A of the Decree No.
32/2002/ND-CP 2002). 9
There is no reliable estimate, and the disparity in figures is staggering. Another official gave an estimate of 10,000 such marriages in 2013. The county civil affairs office's estimate of undocumented marriages for 2011 is two thousand (interview, April 11, 2013). 10
The concept of "three illegals" became part of Chinese official rhetoric in the early to mid-2000s. It refers to people who violated China's Entry and Exit Law in relation to the conditions of entry, stay, and work in China (Zhuang 2007).
